Su m m ary: How are we to conceive of the relationship(s) between classical depictions of "macrosocial" phenomena and the empirically observable world of situated human practices and interactions? Sociologists since Weber have ad dressed this problem in a variety of ways, but persistent conceptual difficulties remain largely unresolved. In this discus sion, the fundamental issue of the "observability" of the "macrosocial" will be the focus of analytical attention. In what ways do the putatively "macro" phenomena become instantiated in, and in other ways observable through, practical hu man actions and interactions? Are "macro" phenomena best construed as "containers" of local, human practices, per haps exerting independent "effects" upon them? Or are "macro" phenomena brought to life by, and thus made occa sionally relevant in and through, the practices of people in analyseable ways? In pursuing the latter possibility, some of the work of Harvey Sacks on membership categorization practices is found to be useful.
Garfinkel's remarkably innovative vision of a mode of sociological analysis he termed "ethno methodology" (1967/1984) has in recent years be come detached from its historical relationship to key issues in social theory, in large measure due to the success of the technical field of "conversation analysis" which owes its genesis to many of his the oretical contributions. However, an abiding issue within ethnomethodology broadly conceived has been the nature of social order and social organisa tion and the appropriate methods for investigating the properties of these phenomena. Among the primary problems confronted by contemporary so cial theorists has been the development of an ade quate conceptual framework for the depiction of the nature of "macrosocial" phenomena. I submit in this essay that various theses advanced within ethnomethodology permit us to cast this issue in a novel fashion, and enable us to approach some via ble solutions to the problems which are generated by contemplations of the nature of macrosocial phenomena and their relationship(s) to quotidian human conduct. The 'micro-macro' linkage problem, as it is called in contemporary sociological theory,* 1 is an issue which requires intensive logical analysis. However, notwithstanding various current treatments which it has received, I believe that a proper logical solu tion has not (yet) been forthcoming or. if it has, I am not aware of it. It is the purpose of this essay to argue for what I shall claim is a contribution to the solution to the core problems. Identifying what constitute the 'core problems' will itself require de tailed discussion. In my view, this must involve, and in the first instance, an analysis of the ontologi cal problems arising out of a consideration of the nature of macro-(as well as micro-) social phe nomena, from the solution of which significant methodological implications may be derived. I have visited this issue before,2 although this earlier treatment was almost certainly considered (by those whom it sought to engage) as merely a reiter ation of what was then taken to be a conventional 'ethnomethodological' position. In what follows, I shall advance a series of arguments designed to show that the proper route to a solution to the 'micro-macro' relationship problem is to be found in a systematic elucidation of the logic of our ordi nary practices (including our communicative prac-2 Coulter (1982) . In this paper, I argued for the position that the clarification of the nature of "macro-social" phe nomena requires a fuller elucidation of the grammar of macro-concepts than has been entertained in the many controversies that have been stimulated by the putative "macro-micro relationship" problem. For a more recent version of the ethnomethodological approach to the "problem of linkage" between the "macro-social" and "micro-social", see Richard A. Hilbert (1990) . In his sub sequent book, (Hilbert 1992 tices) in our ordinary life circumstances. If this means that we must re-visit the earlier 'ethnomethodological' themes, then all I can say is: better late than never.
'Macrosocial' Phenomena
Reflecting upon the results of their intellectualhistorical investigation of the concept of 'society' itself in the classical traditions of sociology, Frisby and Sayer concluded that: "To the question, then, 'Does sociology need to ground itself in a concept of society?' an empirical answer would have to be resoundingly in the negative. Sociology can apparently get by perfectly well without society. Indeed a more than plausible case can be made for saying that so ciological knowledge has progressed to the extent that the discipline has at last liberated itself from fruitless speculation on society as such -however conceived -and turned its attention to the empirical study of real instances of human sociation." (Frisby/Sayer 1986: 122, emphasis added).
While a good case may be made for this assess ment of classical sociological work in relation to 'society' as its putatively central phenomenon of study, it is abundantly clear that many other 'macro-categories' enjoy a rich life in the research and theorising of contemporary sociologists, and many of these modern macro-level inquiries do not lend themselves generally to description as "empirical studies] of real instances of human sociation", in Frisby's and Sayers's terms. What are the putative 'macro-social' phenomena within modern sociological discourse? Any list of such phenomena would be bound to include at least the following: states, nations, governments, legal systems, health systems, corporations, firms, banks, universities, hospitals, armed forces, gangs, crowds, revolutions, social classes, and the like. Efforts to conceptualise modern (usually industri al) societies as holistic 'social systems' may have waned since Parsons (with the exception of some of the 'neo-functionalists' such as Luhmann and Alexander with their somewhat diverse emphases, and of the neo-Marxist tradition with its sustained treatment of capitalism as a 'system'), but there is still much study of the 'stratification system', for example, and analyses of bureaucracy, large-scale social organisations, the state, the military, the capitalist market (whether construed nationallyor internationally, especially after Mandel and Wallerstein, among others), etc., abound. The 'macro' level of inquiry is alive and well, and takes many forms.
One long-standing tradition of 'macro'-level analy sis in sociology is the 'comparative-historical' ap proach, which traces its roots to the comparative institutional analyses of Max Weber. Often consid ered a classical proponent of 'methodological indi vidualism', Weber's actual investigations show clearly that his central category of ('multicausal') analysis was not 'the individual' actor but the con cept of the Träger, the bearer or 'carrier' of pat terned action-orientations. In our re-analysis of the micro-macro linkage issue, we shall have occa sion to return to this concept, albeit in a somewhat different sense than that employed by Weber. For him, as Kalberg has commented, "carriers stand at the very center of his multicausality; he repeatedly calls attention to them". (Kalberg 1994: 58) . Thus, in giving his account of the emergence of the dis tinctively 'formally rational' capitalist social orga nisation of the Northern European countries, We ber focussed upon the 'carriers' of the doctrines of ascetic Calvinist Protestantism: in discussing the persistence of Confucianism for two millenia in China, he stresses the role of the patrimonial bu reaucracy and the literati stratum, and in account ing for the persistence of Hinduism in India, he fo cusses upon the Brahmins as its carrier stratum.3 * Rather than postulate mere 'material conditions' (in Marxist fashion) or disengaged 'ideational ele ments' as moving forces in history (after Hegel), Weber identifies the living, human embodiments of concrete action-orientations in specific groups of people, from named individuals (such as, inter alia, Franklin and Baxter in The Protestant Ethic thesis) to concretely identifiable, 'self-conscious' social 'strata' (such as political parties, churches, sects, states or voluntary enterprises comprising in dividuals too numerous -and frequently too dis tant in history -to identify enumeratively). Kal berg observes that in Weber's accounts: "The doctrine of early Islam was deeply penetrated by the status ethic of its original carrier stratum: a knightly order of disciplined crusaders and conquerors. Christianity's be lief system was shaped significantly in Antiquity by its original carriers: itinerant artisan journeymen, pettybourgeois merchants, and, more generally, urban civic strata." {Ibid., p. 60).
For Weber, 'methodological individualism' meant eschewing the reification of 'structural entities' by referring whatever 'macro-categories' were being used to their actual bearers, even though these were not always nameable nor enumerable. Weber warned against the proclivity to reify structural concepts in sociology in the early passages of his magnum opus, Economy and Society. Discussing the categories of 'state', 'nation', 'corporation', 'fa mily' and 'army corps', he wrote: A little further on, he remarks that:
"It is vital to be continually clear about this in order to av oid the 'reification' of these concepts. A 'state', for exam ple, ceases to exist in a sociologically relevant sense when ever there is no longer a probability that certain kinds of meaningfully oriented action will take place." (ibid., p. 27).
We shall explore the ramifications of this point of view further, and take note of certain revisions to it which our analysis will be found to entail. In another, although related, tradition of sociologi cal inquiry, the 'micro' level, has long been charac terised as the domain of the many modes of analy sis of social (interpersonal) interaction, from the quantitative variety of 'social-psychological' stud ies to the (Chicago-inspired) ethnographic analys es of everyday interactions in diverse settings. Blumer's programmatics for what he called "symbolic interactionism" contained several attacks upon conventional macro-level modes of analysis, espe cially the practice of 'operationalisation' of ordi nary 'macro'-concepts and the depiction of do mains of social life as 'variables'.4 For most sym bolic interactionists, all 'macro' phenomena are either abstractions from, or actually consist in, pat-4 Blumer's famous essays on these issues were reproduced in his landmark collection (1969), but they are (regrettaby) seldom addressed or discussed these days by mod ern macro-level analysts in sociology. A more recent, al beit related, conception of the micro-macro linkage, is that of Randall Collins, who argues that "macro" pheno mena are "emergent" from the "micro-level" interactions between people. (Randall Collins (1981). I dispute this "emergence" thesis in the main text of this essay.
terns of social interaction between people.5 Some of the more 'radical' among them would argue that 'macro-categories' of analysis are essentially lin ked to Durkheimian or Marxist-inspired modes of structural investigation and theorising, and are oc casionally claimed to be nothing more than 'reifi cations' (i.e., fallacious concretisations): no exis tential or ontological status is to be accorded to any of them, since all that exists sociologically is said to be social interaction in all of its forms. "Macro-social" phenomena are illegitimate objec tifications of interactional processes from a strictly sociological point of view, no matter what their sta tus is within the confines of everyday, commonsense reasoning. There is only the micro-level, they would assert. Ethnomethodology has often been located at the 'micro' end of the spectrum, but this is, I shall ar gue at some length in this discussion, a misleading characterisation. Indeed, to the contrary, ethnomethodology's abiding interest in revealing the logic of peoples' practical conduct (including the logic of their everyday reasoning within and about their social environments) can be usefully elaborated so as to undermine the very initial generic dichotomy of 'macro' and 'micro' social phenomena here at is sue. Indeed, much of the talk of "macro-social phe nomena" as emergent from micro-interactional processes strikes me as misplaced, presupposing as it does the possibility of a discrete identification of different "levels", one level somehow emerging from the (lower?) level. This metaphorical con struction raises more questions than it settles, and obscures an adequate characterisation of the vari ous ways in which "macro" phenomena actually feature in our social world. A major step in elucidating this issue is afforded by considering, first, the ways in which people rou tinely and unproblematically use 'the language of the macro level' in the context of living their lives as practical, social agents. It is above all immedi ately apparent to any user of the ordinary language that instances of so-called 'macro' phenomena ex hibit significant differences in how their properties could be conceptualised and in what their 'exis tence' actually amounts to. Almost all of the macro-categories used by sociologists are ordinary-language concepts: such concepts as 'ar my', 'bank', 'state', 'legal system', 'class', 'bureau cracy', etc. are not (or not in the first instance) technical concepts whose meanings intendedly de part from their vernacular usage.6 Consequently, inspecting the rules of use of these categories will illuminate the logic of their conceptualisation. This is emphatically not an effort to avoid the ontologi cal issues in favor of 'linguistic' ones: rather, it will be argued, the analysis of members' vernacular ways of conceptualising 'macro'-social phenomena will be instructive for us in dissolving ontological misconceptions often entertained by theorists (within both 'micro' and 'macro' sociology) and in obtaining a clearer view of the issues which divide them and of how they may be handled.
The 'Observability' of MacroPhenomena
Because many of our macrosocial concepts desig nate institutions which are linked to geographical/ architectural structures (e.g., cities, banks, univer sities, hospitals, police departments, etc.), an ambi guity can readily arise concerning the ways in which such macrosocial phenomena are actually observable within the world of everyday life. There is, of course, one sense in which one may "see" a city (e.g., by flying over it) or a college, bank or hospital (by walking around or through its grounds and inspecting its building(s)), but, socio logically speaking, the social institutions of cities or colleges, companies or consulates (etc.) are clearly not observable in this way. The tendency has been to envisage macrosocial phenomena linked to identifiable material structures as "contained" by or within such material structures. But, once this move is made, puzzles arise: in what sense is the "social institution" itself visible within such mate rial domains as geographical areas and/or achitectural structures? What we locate there are, after all, people saying and doing a great variety of things, not all of which remotely instantiate "citiness", "bank-ness" or "university-ness", etc. It can readily appear as though the symbolic interactionists and methodological individualists are correct to propose that such social structures are abstrac tions from human interactions of specific sorts, and have no genuinely "independent existence" as such. However, this move is made too quickly. Changing the example, for a moment, one can ac tually observe 'crowds', 'riots', 'demonstrations', 'armies' on the march, 'platoons' on the attack, and so forth, and these are surely no "abstrac tions" from the things that people are collectively engaged in. But what is it for a "nation", a "religi ous order", a "city", a "university" or a "bank" to do something?
Consider the following. Bill Clinton announces from within the Oval Office of the White House to a gathering of journalists from the international press corps that "the United States is prepared to invade Haiti unless the junta steps down". Clearly, these are the words of a single individual, but, un der the auspices of the relevant identification cate gories, rules and circumstances of utterance, it is the United States declaring its policy. There is no polling of 250 million people: to think that such would be necessary would be to commit the "fallacy of large numbers" in weighing how it is that action predicates can be assigned to collectiv ities. Consider, further, that when Karol Woytyla asserts (again according to specific rules and in very specifically circumscribed circumstances) that "the Catholic Church will maintain its historic op position to abortion", it isn't Woytyla per se who is declaring this: it is the Church reaffirming/announcing its position. Nor are these cases simply ones of individuals acting as "spokespeople" for their respective institutions. That is a very different identification or membership category, and its as sociated praxis is governed by quite different rules. When the telephone rings and the caller says: "This is Bay Bank. Are you interested in our new money market account?", the person calling may be Jane Doe, but it isn't Jane Doe calling, it is Bay Bank calling, although here Jane Doe is clearly op erating as its representative. Not all cases in which one Or more people do something logically con nected to a "macro-structure", however, is it a mat ter of their behaving as spokepersons or 'represen tatives': rather, on many occasions, their conduct instantiates that of the relevant macro phenomenon. When Mayor Tom Menino and his financial advisers announce that: "the City of Bos ton is determined to lower property taxes", and then these same personnel fix the rates and have them officially approved by the relevant ratifying body, this is the City o f Boston lowering property taxes. The examples can be ramified. Under spe cific ranges of circumstances, when certain persons do and/or say specific sorts of things according to specific rules (rules constituting also under what identification auspices their conduct is to be con strued -e.g., 'Mayor', 'President', 'Pope', etc.), then these cases instantiate the conduct of macro phenomena. They bring these phenomena to life, they realise them, in occasioned ways, such that they (again, recurrently) enter into our lives as part of our structures of relevant orientation. Per haps these are examples of the kind of roles which Weber would have assigned to his Träger in his comparative institutional analyses.
Note, however, that in the case of many macroso cial phenomena, such Träger are either unavailable or only contestably available as such. (Many of the critics of Weber's own 'Protestant Ethic thesis' ac cused him of selectively and, thus, contentiously identifying Calvinism's Träger). For example, whose deeds constitute the "proletariat's" doing something, or the "bourgeoisie's" having decided to X or to do Y are matters of quite extensive con tention, largely because for these macro-concepts there are no formal Träger, and no 'formal' spokespeople or representatives. Marx's famous distinc tion between a "Klasse-an-sich" and a "Klasse-für-sich" appears exactly to exhibit a sensitivity to this issue, where, for Marx, the transition from the for mer to the latter is largely a matter of the emer gence of collective "self-consciousness" (and, for Lenin, in the case of the 'proletariat', the rise of the "vanguard Party"). Of course, many groups, collectivities and institutions in contemporary soci eties comprise self-membershipping organisations (from the "Hell's Angels" to the "SPD", from the "Chrysler Motor Corporation" to "Oxford Uni versity", and from the "British Medical Associa tion" to the "Church of Scientology"), with moreor-less circumscribed but broadly known and subscribed-to rules, credentials, role-allocations, and the rest of the familiar apparatus of "selfconscious" collectivities. Other kinds of collectiv ities and institutions are non-self-membershipping, in the sense that membership itself is not such as to require or presuppose any actual self-conscious "self-organisation" such as characterises the vari ous self-membershipping collectivities. These lat ter would include "genders", "ethnic groups", "so cial classes", "nations" (excluding the phenom enon of "naturalisation"7), "religions" (excluding the phenomena of "baptism" or "conversion"8), and so on. In Jayyusi's terms, we confront quite di verse "social organisations of categorial incum bency" (Jayyusi 1984: Ch. 2) among these different collectivities. How do these distinctions relate to our general theme of the "praxiological" instanti ation of "macro-social" phenomena? In order to address this question, we shall have to introduce some aspects of Harvey Sacks's logical analysis of "membership categorisation practi ces".9 This will comprise my major theme in this ar gument. Sacks observed that any person is a possible in cumbent of an indefinitely large array of equally but alternatively correct identification categories. Thus, a given 'adult male' can be correctly identi fied -although differentially for diverse purposes and in different contexts -as, alternatively, "a la wyer", "a taxpayer", "a Protestant", "a liberal", "an American", "a 'black' [Afro-American]", "a veteran", "a bookworm", "a father", "a son", "a socialite", "a member of the 'middle class'", "a customer", "a divorcee" and so on. Among the many categories of personal identification are the "collectivity categories" which may, also differenti ally, be ascribed to (and on occasion avowed by) people. E.g., "he's French", "she's a Rotarian", "they are Moslems", ,,we are members of the fa culty", etc. Sacks drew a crucial distinction, then, between "correct categorisation" of a person and "relevantly correct categorisation" of a person (or persons), arguing that the satisfaction of criteria of correctness could not suffice to account for any ac tual case of membership categorisation. This is be cause, for example, as I write this paper, whilst it is in some sense "formally correct" to classify me as "a father" (I do indeed have a biologically related daughter), that could not serve as the operationally relevant identification of me for this setting and for this activity. For this setting and for this activity, I am relevantly categorisable as, inter alia, and mini mally, "an academic", perhaps "a professor", "an intellectual" or " a sociologist". It is qua "sociolo gist" etc., but not qua "father", that I am engaged right now in carrying out this intellectual activity.
(Indeed, at least in Anglo-American culture, were you to report that you witnessed a "father" produ ce a piece of written discourse, it would most na turally be heard to be a report on some kind of religiously-relevant literature).
Having sketched the bare essentials of (some of) Sacks's arguments, let us see to what extent they can be brought to bear upon the issue before us: the "praxiological resolution of the micro-macro issue". First of all, as we noted earlier, it would only be a gratuitous insistence upon the "fallacy of large numbers" that might prohibit someone from agreeing that when Karol Woytyla "asserts Papal doctrine" it is the Catholic Church' s position that is enunciated. (No poll of the 600-million-odd prac tising Catholics is at issue here). Provided that his papal incumbency has been legitimately brought about, this relation holds for that sort of activity on his part. Note, of course, the normative element at work here. Some people do and say things expect ing to instantiate whole organizations or even whole 'peoples' where their widespread recog nised illegitimacy either renders the claim ambigu ous or downright absurd. Recall how long it took for Presidents Nelson Mandela and Yasser Arafat to become widely acknowledged (and not without some prevalent and continuing dissent) as the "le gitimate leaders" of the defined populations of the black South Africans and Palestinian Arabs re spectively. There will, clearly, be contestable and borderline cases, cases fraught with struggle, polit ical, religious, professional, and ethical, in respect of their actual or potential ratifiability. However, none of this gainsays the central point being ad vanced here: indeed, such instances merely rein force its cogency. Collectivities have their life in and through their praxiological instantiations, and especially through the occasions which make rele vant the instantiating membership categories. Thus, it really isn't "Jane Doe" calling "Jeff Coulter" when it is "Bay Bank" calling me, just as it really isn't "Karol Woytyla" qua private citizen who in stantiates Catholicism on those occasions when the enunciations are formally produced. Jane Doe, and Karol Woytyla, may say and do a host of things in their lives, but only on occasions bounded by specific sorts of rules do their sayings/doings make relevant those categories such as to instantiate the action o f a collectivity. Armies can plan coups d 'e tat, companies can fix prices, governments can dec lare wars, and so forth, only insofar as the practices and praxis-relevant identities o f persons, sometimes few and occasionally many, are recognisably invoc able.
The "Occasional Relevance66 of the Macrosocial Order
Much of the foregoing will be anathema to theo rists who subscribe to "structuralist" conceptions of the macrosocial order, or to modes of sociologi cal model-building we could call "externalist". After all, the argument appears to posit nothing at all "behind" or "over and above" the properties of situated practices and the praxis-relevant identifi cations of their agents. Surely, it may be objected, macro-level phenomena "exist" even when no single member is engaged in any kind of macroinstantiating conduct of the kind discussed here? Isn't this merely an "immanentist" argument? Suppose that no soldier in a given army engages for an entire day in, e.g., "saluting", "drilling", "weapons cleaning", "combat maneouvres", even "combat" itself, and so on, throughout the entire array of action predicates logically related to the category of "army". Would this entail the disap pearance or "dissolution" of the "army" itself! This seems to be an absurd consequence. How ever, we may approach a resolution of this issue in the following way.
Consider the case of the "soldier" who enters a store and becomes, for the purpose of a transac tion, a "customer". Does this mean that he is no longer a "soldier"? Or consider the case of the "soldier" who is off-duty and is having a domestic quarrel about his family's finances with his wife. Isn't this "husband" who is doing the quarelling also, and simultaneously, still a "soldier" (i.e., an incumbent of a "macro-level" category -the armed forces, the army, etc.)? Our intuitions are perhaps ambiguous on this issue. What may con tribute to confusion is the fact that "soldiers" (un like "husbands" and "customers") are typically uniformed when behaving under such categoryauspices, and thus they are incumbents of a re stricted class of "membership categories": those which are routinely "emblematically assignable", or "perceptually recordable" at a glance, so to speak. (Policemen, nuns, hospital physicians, traf-fic wardens, firemen, etc., would be other instanc es). Feminists likewise speak of the "omnirelevance" of gender categories, and some others make this claim for (certain) "racial" or "ethnic" categ ories.
The perceptual assignability o f categories, however, does not entail their operational relevance. Unless the perceptually assignable membership category is somehow made or rendered operational in and through specific courses o f action/activities, then claims for its relevance are either false or, at best, undecidable. Some psychological theorists are ad amant that everything we do is a function of some assignable "personality type", but similar argu ments apply here as well.10 * Where does this leave us in respect of the question: "is a soldier still a soldier when he is (e.g.) a 'custo mer' or a 'husband', and, if so, then in what does this identity consist?" This is a tricky issue, but I think that it can be resolved. 'Being' a soldier is a matter of being able legitimately and relevantly to claim such a status, as well as a matter of others' being able legitimately and relevantly to invoke it in ascriptive practices. In the first-person, it is an issue of a legitimate capacity which is exhibitable independently from the many other manifestations we could call "soldiering". In the sense in which a legitimate capacity can be said to "exist" indepen dently from any local praxiological exhibition of it, then, in that specific sense, of course, one can "be" a soldier when off-duty, not "soldiering", and so on. And, similarly, "armies" can be said still to "ex ist" when no soldier at all is engaged in manifesting army-membership or army-relevant practices. Note, however, that being stripped of, or abandon ing, the capacity o f legitimate claim, if instantiated en masse, so to speak, does dissolve -render non existent -the "army" and all of its "soldiers" (as when an army completely "de-mobilises", or is for cibly dissolved, after a war). Such a collectivity has its 'existence' in these ways. And so do many oth ers, although not all of them. The central issue before us, then, is this: in what social circumstances can a (lay or professional) observer/reporter, who respects the logic of social sit uations, invoke collectivity-categories in assigning some such to an agent of an activity? It is to this is sue that I shall now direct my attention.
'Category-Boundedness9 as a Constraint upon the 'Relevance9 of the 'MacroLevel'
In elaborating upon his analysis of the logic of the identification of persons in everyday life, Sacks (in Turner 1974) noted that any universe of human activities or practices may be partitioned into those which are "categorially-bound" to some specific (or restricted set of) membership categ ories, and those which are not (i.e., those which are "categorially open" in the sense that no relev ant identity is entailed by the performance of the practice). Thus, for example, we can ascertain the category-bound status of an activity or practice by noting how straightforward it is to make an infer ence from the characterisation of an activity to a characterisation of the relevant identity of its "doer". The simplest pronoun substitution test will suffice. Consider the following as serious and literal locutions produced in social-communicative relations: "He sentenced him to ten years' impris onment", "She diagnosed lymphoma", "He ar rested them for disturbing the peace", "She fired him on the spot". In these cases, one can right away discern the relevant membership categories which apply to the persons represented purely pronomially in the examples: viz., 'judge', 'physi cian', 'cop', 'employer', or their cognates, respect ively. Contrast such cases to the following: "He committed suicide", "She interrupted them" and "He complained about the heat". No specific identification categories can be inferred in these instances (the pronomial exhibition of gender aside). "Committing suicide", "interrupting" and "complaining" are categorially open activities. Of course, there are some cases which resist such a clean-cut partitioning, such as, e.g., "saluting" or "teaching", where in many cases the conventional ties between saluting and being a military person and between teaching and being a teacher do not constitute ties of strict categorial boundedness, since non-military personnel can salute others (and in various ways) and parents can teach their kids without eo ipso being 'teachers', etc. These complications aside, it is reasonably clear that many practices are quite simply institutional prac tices, presupposing and/or instantiating the opera tions of macrosocial phenomena, whilst others (most others, in fact) are not. I refer to this as the phenomenon of the "occasional relevance" of the macrosocial level to our everyday lives, and offer it as a sharp contrast to perspectives and modes of theorising which insist upon the omnirelevance of a macro-sociological 'contextualisation' for every thing we do. Newspaper reportage11 is replete with efforts to contrive linkages between macrosocial identities and categorially open practices. "Ex-Green Beret goes on rampage", "Black youths loot local video store", "Government official caught with prosti tute", and so on, exemplify this form of contrived linkage, where the 'relevance' of the selected categorial identifications is clearly not derivable from criteria of correct identification alone, and is cer tainly not an invocation of a relationship of "category-boundedness". In referring to such lin kages as "contrived", I do not mean to suggest that no relevance whatsoever can be attached to the categories selected to identify the producers of the activities in question. As an account unfolds, ef forts may be made (and often enough successfully) to argue for, demonstrate or portray the possible relevance of the selected categories (as when, e.g., it is revealed that the identification of the 'john' in the 'prostitution' example as a "Government offi cial" has been made simply on the grounds that he is a "public figure", or, more strongly perhaps, on the grounds that the prostitute he has been caught with has connections to a foreign intelligence ser vice, etc.). On the other hand, however, the possi bilities for "gratuitous" linkages remain wide open: for example, the youths who looted the store were indeed 'black', but they were also, inter alia, 'unemployed', 'homeless' and 'hungry'. These are, exactly, issues within practical sociological reason ing.
In the space allotted to me, I cannot aspire to do justice to the full complexity of the issues which are enjoined when a fresh perspective is adopted for construing the micro-macro linkage issue in the social sciences. I shall, therefore, conclude this es say with some brief, but hopefully suggestive, points, which I believe should be borne in mind when this issue arises in our intellectual work as sociologists and behavioral scientists.
Concluding Remarks
Max Weber's "methodological individualism" and Herbert Blumer's "symbolic interactionism" both advocated de-reifying solutions to the problem of conceptualising "macrosocial" phenomena, but neither adequately appreciated the complexity of the grammars of our macrosocial concepts. In par ticular, and notwithstanding their occasional pro grammatic declarations, neither furnished clear so lutions to the problem of the relationship between everyday human conduct and the macrosocial or der, because neither addressed the fundamental problem of the relevance of such concepts/phenomena to the organisation of our everyday activi ties and our practical reasoning about such activi ties. In particular, an adequate appreciation of the role of the "macro-order" in our everyday lives re veals that such phenomena are variously instanti ated in what we say and do and also that our con duct is by no means omnirelevantly linked to "macro-level" considerations. What needs to be addressed in this regard at a later point is the nature and role of "economic" phe nomena, a topic I cannot address in this schematic discussion. However, a first move in the right di rection here is, I believe, a rejection of the notion that "the economy" is a "system" of interdeterministic "parts" which works according to principles that can be discerned in complete ("exo genous") independence of our everyday (econom ic) practices of monetary reckoning, 'embedded' decision-making and sundry other contingencies so systematically neglected in economic models of our economic behavior.12 Developing this argu ment, however, is something I cannot pursue ade quately here.
